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COMMENTS
2. The right of resolution is an accessory of the purchase
money note representing the price so that such right is trans-
ferred by the vendor without any other act than the mere
assignment of the note to another, and this right ceases to
exist after the note has prescribed.
W. T. PEGUES
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURANCE
CONTRACTS; HOSPITALIZATION
Courts always have great difficulty in distinguishing con-
tracts of insurance' from other contracts containing obligations
contingent upon the happening of certain events. Examples of
the latter are contracts for the performance of personal services,
contracts which provide for contingent incidental benefits, and
contracts of warranty and guaranty.2 This discussion is confined
chiefly to the problem involved in those insurance contracts in
which the promisor, for a consideration, undertakes to do some
act valuable to the insured upon the happening of a specified
event. Because of the vital importance to the general public of
the recent rapid increase in the number of plans for the distribu-
tion of the costs of hospitalization, 8 special consideration will be
given to that type of contract.
The problem focuses on the application of the varying defi-
1. The decisions involving the question of whether a company is trans-
acting the business of insurance arise principally under the state regulatory
acts, the question being presented in diverse ways: Hunt v. Public Mut. Bene-
fit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938) (injunction sought by com-
pany); South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, 184 S.E. 875 (Ga. 1936)
(injunction sought by state); State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287, 14 AtI. 195 (1888)
(action for penalty); Fikes v. State, 87 Miss. 251, 39 So. 783 (1906) (prosecu-
tion of agent); State ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St.
90, 76 N.E. 567 (1905) (mandamus by company); State v. Western Auto Sup-
ply Co., 134 Ohio St. 163, 16 N.E. (2d) 256 (1938) (quo warranto). However,
the action may be a private one: Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v.
Guillaume, 222 Ill. App. 543 (1921); Marcus v. Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa.
429, 88 Atl. 678 (1913).
2. For a complete discussion of the difficulties in distinguishing between
contracts of insurance and other contracts of contingent obligation, see
Vance, Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 57-65, §§ 23-25.
3. The largest group hospitalization insurance plan in the United States
was announced on June 9th by Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., chairman of General
Motors Corporation. Times-Picayune, June 10, 1939, p. 2, col. 7.
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nitions4 of insurance evolved by courts5 and legislatures," for the
different concepts of insurance may account to a large extent for
the apparent conflict in cases wherein attempts have been made
to distinguish between insurance and other contracts. Professor
Vance has stated the five distinguishing elements of a contract of
insurance to be:
"(a) The insured possesses an interest of some kind sus-
ceptible of pecuniary estimation, known as an insurable in-
terest.
"(b) The insured is subject to a risk of loss through the
destruction or impairment of that interest by the happening
of designated perils.
"(c) The insurer assumes that risk of loss.
"(d) Such assumption is part of a general scheme to dis-
tribute actual losses among a large group of persons bearing
similar risks.
"(e) As consideration for the insurer's promise, the in-
sured makes a ratable contribution to a general insurance fund,
called a premium."'
4. It is probably best that the definitions of insurance be sufficiently
broad and general to cover changing phases in which the problem may be
presented. In re Hogan, 8 N.D. 301, 78 N.W. 1051 (1899).
5. Vredenburgh v. Physicians Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509, 511 (1906):
"A contract for Insurance is still neither more nor less than a contract to
indemnify for loss or injury or for damage to the person or thing which is
the subject matter of the contract." Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass.
149, 160 (1870): "A contract of insurance is an agreement, by which one
party, for a consideration ... promises to make a certain payment of money
upon the destruction or injury of something In which the other party has
an interest." But a warning against pressing the idea of indemnity too far
is given in Home Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 107 (C.C.A. 2nd,
1931), affirmed 285 U.S. 191, 52 S.Ct. 319, 76 L.Ed. 695 (1932).
6. Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 175, § 2, provides: "A contract of insurance
is an agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay
money or its equivalent, or to do an act valuable to the insured, upon the
destruction, loss or injury of something in which the other party has an in-
terest." Okla. Stats. Ann. (1937), tit. 36, § 2 provides: "A contract of insur-
ance is an agreement by which one party, for a consideration, promises to
pay money or its equivalent or to do an act valuable to the assured, or to
procure others to do an act, or to make a reduction in their rates or charges,
which action or reduction is valuable to the assured, upon the destruction,
loss or Injury of something in which the other party has an interest." Wash.
Laws 1911, c. 49, § 1, defines Insurance as follows: "Insurance is a contract
whereby one party called the 'insurer,' for a consideration, undertakes to pay
money or its equivalent, or to do an act valuable to another party called the
'insured,' or to his 'beneficiary,' upon the happening of the hazard or peril
Insured against, whereby the party insured or his beneficiary suffers loss or
Injury."
7. Vance, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2-7, § 3.
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In the greater number of decisions of the risk distributing ele-
ment is not listed as a primary requisite of the contract of in-
surance; however, the importance of stressing the fact that
insurance is not merely a design for shifting the risk but is also a
means of distributing the risk cannot be over-emphasized. "Hedg-
ing" is a risk shifting device and cannot be classified as insur-
ance for the risk of loss is merely shifted to another person.,
Insurance means the acceptance of risks, some of which will be
losses, and the spreading of these losses among the persons in-
sured so that the insurer may accept each risk at a fraction of the
possible liability.,
Isolated contracts of service and contracts of insurance must
be distinguished. While the primary purpose of a contract of
insurance is to indemnify an individual for losses resulting from
the happening of a certain contingency,"° the basic purpose of a
contract for the performance of contingent services is to furnish,
for a consideration, certain personal services. 1 A corporation
contracting to furnish legal services to a large group of persons,
is generally held to be engaged in the business of insurance. 2
The primary purpose of such a contract is not to render personal
services but is to indemnify losses which result from defending
actions brought against the insured person. All of the essential
elements of the contract of insurance are present: the company
agrees for a certain consideration to perform certain services for
the promisee upon the happening of a specified contingency and
the contract is part of a general scheme to spread the losses
among the individuals who are entitled to similar services and
subject to the same risks. However, there are contrary decisions1 3
8. Bolfing v. Schoener, 144 Minn. 425, 175 N.W. 901 (1920).
9. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412, 34 S.Ct. 612, 58
L.Ed. 1011, L.R.A. 1915C 1189 (1914). Cf. Home Title Ins. Co. v. United States,
50 F. (2d) 107 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1931), affirmed 285 U.S. 191, 52 S.Ct. 319, 76 L.Ed.
695 (1932).
10. "To grant indemnity or security against loss for a consideration is
not only the design and purpose of an insurance company, but is also the
dominant and characteristic feature of the contract of insurance." Common-
wealth v. Equitable Beneficial Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412, 18 Atl. 1112, 1113 (1890). Cf.
State v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N.E. 93, 96 Am.
St. Rep. 635 (1903).
11. Commonwealth v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n, 178 Pa. 636, 36 AtI. 197, 36
L.R.A. 589 (1897) (contract for keeping a bicycle in repair for a fixed fee and
replacing it if stolen).
12. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 290
(C.C.A. 9th, 1912); Allin v. Motorist's Alliance, 234 Ky. 714, 29 S.W. (2d) 19,
71 A.L.R. 688 (1930); Physicians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111
N.W. 396 (1907).
18. Vredenburgh v. Physicians Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906); State
ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90, 76 N.E. 567 (1905).
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based on the argument that, when the company does not agree
to pay the judgment, an essential element of insurance-indem-
nity-is lacking.14 The liability of the company is said to cease
at the point where indemnity begins. In some jurisdictions, the
issue has been avoided by holding that these corporations are
illegally engaged in the practice of law.15 From the social stand-
point, the holding that such corporations are engaged in insur-
ance seems a good one. This is so because of the desirability to
protect from fraudulent management the reserves which the
policyholders have contributed and from which services will be
furnished.
There have been a number of cases in which the insurance
feature has been used as a device to increase business,16 and an
example is found in the recent decision of Ollendorff Watch Co.
v. Pink.7 Included in this form of sales promotion are those cases
in which, under the terms of a conditional sales contract, the
vendor promises to cancel the promisee's debt upon the latter's
death. 8 This means of inducing the public to patronize certain
businesses has been termed insurance by the courts, and the atti-
tude has been taken that if one acquires insurance benefits he is
entitled to be protected by state regulation." In some instances,
such agreements have been condemned as being in violation of
usury laws. 20
The social expediency of bringing these sales contracts under
state supervision is probably not as marked as in other insurance
14. However, if the contract provides that the contractor shall pay any
judgment rendered, it has been held to be a policy of liability or indemnity
insurance. Schambs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 259 Fed. 55, 6 A.L.R. 1231
(C.C.A. 6th, 1919).
15. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188
N.E. 827 (1933); In re Maclub of America, 3 N.E. (2d) 272 (Mass. 1936); Sea-
well v. Carolina Motor Club, 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936).
16. Hunt v. Public Mut. Benefit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1938) (promise to pay benefits in case of death or emergencies to those hold-
ing coupons obtained with certain goods); Commonwealth v. Philadelphia
Inquirer, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 463 (1892), as cited in Note (1929) 63 A.L.R. 711, 765,
n. 228 (plan whereby a certain payment would be made to the representative
of anyone accidentally killed while bearing a signed copy of a certain news-
paper).
17. 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E. (2d) 676 (1938), where the court found a contract
of insurance in the vendor's undertaking to replace each vendee's watch if
stolen within a year.
18. Attorney General v. C. E. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N.E. 371, 35
A.L.R. 1037 (1924); State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N.W. 472 (1902); Barna
v. Clifford Country Estates, 143 Misc. 813, 258 N.Y. Supp. 671 (1932).
19. Hunt v. Public Mut. Benefit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1938).
20. Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. McLachlan, 59 Minn. 468, 61 N.W. 560
(1894); Equity Service Corp. v. Agull, 156 Misc. 552, 281 N.Y. Supp. 292 (1935).
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cases, since the individuals purchasing from such businesses do
get some return from the. money invested. However, in addition
to protecting the purchasers entitled to insurance benefits, the
courts as societal agents are in a measure protecting the business
men who are in competition with the enterprising companies
which devised the insurance scheme as a lure to the buying pub-
lic.2"1 The insurance feature may be considered an inducement to
the purchaser to buy, and part of the profits so derived may be
deemed to constitute the consideration for the promise of the com-
pany.22 The risk distributing feature may be found in larger sales
which will mean an increase in the amount of profits, thus con-
stituting a reserve.
It is of vital importance to distinguish between guaranty,
warranty and insurance in determining whether the device used
to increase sales is a contract of insurance.2 3 A guaranty is a
promise that the amount contracted to be paid will be paid or
that the services contracted for will be performed; 24 a warranty
promises indemnity against defects in the article sold; 25 and in-
surance indemnifies against damage resulting from perils outside
of the article itself.2 6 Insurance 'is subject to state regulation,
while guaranties and warranties are merely parts of accepted
business conduct and are governed by their own peculiar rules.
Although innumerable schemes have been used in the at-
tempt to conceal actual insurance transactions, 2 7 the courts have
21. Hunt v. Public Mut. Benefit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1938).
22. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 37 S.Ct. 232, 61 L.Ed. 511 (1917);
Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn, 272 U.S. 295, 47 S.Ct. 88, 71 L.Ed. 243 (1926);
Hunt v. Public Mut. Benefit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1938);
Ollendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E. (2d) 676 (1938).
23. Ollendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E. (2d) 676 (1938).
24. Cole Bros. & Hart v. Haven, 7 N.W. 383 (Iowa 1880), where a light-
ning rod dealer agreed to pay all the damages resulting to purchaser's build-
ing from lightning it was held to be a contract of guaranty. For a consid-
eration of the differences between warranty, guaranty and insurance, see
Ollendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 34, 17 N.E. (2d) 676, 677 (1938).
25. Evans & Tate v. Premier Refining Co., 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S.E. 553
(1923), where a vendor of oil agreed to replace the gears of customers' cars
if broken by natural wear and tear it was held to be a warranty.
26. State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto Supply Co., 134 Ohio St. 163, 16
N.E. (2d) 256 (1938), where the vendor of automobile tires guaranteed against
defects In material or workmanship and contracted to indemnify the pur-
chaser regardless of the kind of injury, the former part of the contract was
a warranty and the latter was Insurance.
27. Physicians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N.W. 396 (1907)
(contracts for legal services); State v. Bean, 193 Minn. 113, 258 N.W. 18 (1934)
(contract to furnish bond and defend against litigation); People v. Roschli,
275 N.Y. 26, 9 N.E. (2d) 763 (1937) (contract to replace glass and to keep it
puttied); National Auto Service Corp. v. State, 55 S.W. (2d) 209 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) (contract for garage service).
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discarded the forms of the contracts and, looking at the acts to
be performed, have held them to be insurance contracts. 28 These
attempts at subterfuge have merited the express disapproval of
the courts. In this class is the contract whereby the promisor
obligates himself to perform services upon the happening of cer-
tain contingencies-for example, the agreement by an under-
taker, for small periodical payments or for assessments at the
death of each member, to furnish burial, is held to be an insur-
ance contract.2 It has been suggested that companies offering
such contracts should come under the close supervision of the
state because the policies are usually issued to persons who are
poor and improvident and who need to be protected against the
possibilities of insolvency and fraud.80
A question likely to be of considerable importance in the near
future is whether insurance statutes should be applied to plans
for the distribution of the costs of hospitalization among a large
number of people. Courts have held certain agreements not to
be insurance contracts, when they were clearly such.31 Where the
hospitalization plans are not specifically included within the scope
of the insurance laws of the various states, the courts may stress
many factors in order to avoid subjecting hospitalization to ex-
28. State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N.W. 472, 474 (1902): "The real char-
acter of this promise, or of the act to be performed, cannot be concealed or
changed by the use or absence of words in the contract itself; and it is
wholly immaterial that on its face this contract does not expressly purport
to be one of insurance, and that this word nowhere appears in it. Its nature
is to be determined by an examination of its contents, and not by the terms
used." Cf. Physicians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N.W. 396
(1907); State v. Spalding, 166 Minn. 167, 207 N.W. 317 (1926); Commonwealth
v. Fidelity Land Value Assur. Co., 312 Pa. 425, 167 Atl. 300 (1933).
29. South Georgia Funeral Homes v. Harrison, ,182 Ga. 60, 184 S.E. 875
(1936); State v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N.E. 68, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 197 (1908);
State v. Wichita Mut. Burial Ass'n, 73 Kan. 179, 84 Pac. 757 (1906); Young
Men's Protestant Temperance and Ben. Soc. v. City of Fall River, 160 Mass.
409, 36 N.E. 57 (1894); Fikes v. State, 87 Miss. 251, 39 So. 783 (1906); Renschler
v. State, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N.E. 758, L.R.A. 1915D 501, Ann. Cas. 1916C
1014 (1914); Oklahoma S.W. Burial Ass'n v. State, 135 Okla. 151, 274 Pac. 642,
63 A.L.R. 704 (1928); Sgro v. Pennsylvania Burial Co., 113 Pa. Super. 20, 171
Atl. 425 (1934); Sisson v. Prata Undertaking Co., 49 R.I. 132, 141 Atl. 76 (1928);
State v. Mutual Mortuary Ass'n, 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S.W. (2d) 664 (1933); State
v. Globe Casket & Undertaking Co., 82 Wash. 124, 143 Pac. 878 (1914). Cf.
State v. Gooch, 165 Tenn. 97, 52 S.W. (2d) 143 (1932) (a burial association
with benefits limited to $100 is not subject to regulation by the insurance
department).
In Louisiana, Act 136 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 4170.32-4170.49]
was passed with regard to such associations, even though no litigation had
taken place prior to its enactment.
30. State v. DeWitt C. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So. 230 (1933); Fikes
v. State, 87 Miss. 251, 39 So. 783 (1906).
31. See cases cited in notes 32, 33, 34, 36 and 49, infra.
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cessively strenuous restrictions. Some of the factors thus empha-
sized by the courts are: (1) the company does not guarantee the
performance of the individuals who are to furnish the services; 82
(2) it does not perform the services itself;8 8 (3) it operates within
a limited area; 4 and (4) the happening of the contingency is de-
pendent upon the will of the promisee 5
In the early case of Commonwealth v. Provident Bicycle
Ass'n,8 6 the court held that the absence of an agreement to pay
money precluded the contract from being one of insurance. 7 A
makeweight factor considered by the court was that the con-
sideration was not graded according to the risks involved.8 8 At
present, it is well settled that a stipulation for the payment of
money is not a requisite of an insurance contract.8 8 Obviously, a
person may contract for some act of value to secure himself
against charges which may become necessary.40 If the make-
weight argument used by the court in Commonwealth v. Provi-
32. In State v. Universal Service Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151 Pac. 768, Ann.
Cas. 1916C 1017 (1915), the court held that a corporation contracting to pro-
cure medical service and drugs for patients was not engaged in the insur-
ance business on the ground that it did not guarantee or insure performance
by the individuals who were to furnish the services or goods.
33. Vredenburgh v. Physicians Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906).
34. Moresh v. O'Regan, 120 N.J. Eq. 534, 187 Atl. 619 (1936).
35. State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287, 14 Atl. 195 (1888), where an agreement by
which bachelors who agreed to pay a certain fee would receive a maximum
of $1000 if they did not marry within two years was held to be in the nature
of a gambling contract and illegal.
36. 178 Pa. St. Rep. 636, 36 Atl. 197 (1897).
37. Insofar as Commonwealth v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n was based on
an absence of an agreement to pay money, it was followed in Moresh v.
O'Regan, 120 N.J. Eq. 534, 187 Atl. 619 (1936).
38. Commonwealth v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n, 178 Pa. St. Rep. 636, 642,
36 Atl. 197, 199-200 (1897): "The defendant . . . receives the same sum from
each person, although it undertakes to perform services which may vary
widely in value among the members served. . . . whatever may be the loss
or injury which each member may sustain, he Is entitled to have it made
good in consideration of the same unvarying sum."
39. Hunt v. Public Mut. Benefit Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1938) (company giving coupons with certain goods and promising to pay
benefits in case of death or emergencies); State v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86
N.E. 68, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 197 (1908) (contract to furnish funeral services);
Attorney General v. C. E. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371, 35 A.L.R.
1037 (1924) (cancellation of debt upon death of purchaser); Physicians' De-
fense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N.W. 396 (1907) (contracts for legal
services); State v. Bean, 193 Minn. 113, 258 N.W. 18 (1934) (agreement to fur-
nish garage service, legal services and bail bond); People v. Standard Plate
Glass & Salvage Co., 174 App. Div. 501, 156 N.Y. Supp. 1012 (1916) (agree-
ment to keep glass puttied, or replaced if broken); Ollendorff Watch Co. v.
Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E. (2d) 676 (1938) (agreement to replace stolen
watches). Contra: Moresh v. O'Regan, 120 N.J. Eq. 534, 187 AtI. 619 (1936)
(agreement to replace glass held not to be insurance).
40. See cases cited in note 38, supra.
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dent Bicycle Ass'n" were sound, it would lead to the conclusion
that hospitalization is not insurance. However, this argument is
fallacious since the insurer may or may not grade the risks de-
pending upon whether he can make a profit.
In determining whether a corporation is conducting an insur-
ance business, the courts sometimes draw a distinction between
the corporations conducted for profit and those operated solely
for philanthropic motives.42 If a company is designed to make
profits, it is classified as an insurance company; if it is a philan-
thropic organization, it is not subjected to insurance laws. Hos-
pitals engaging in hospitalization service plans might be included
in the latter category if the courts should deem it undesirable to
subject such organizations to the insurance statutes. Where the
courts draw a distinction between philanthropic and profit organi-
zations, it is probably due to different statutory enactments with
reference to benevolent organizations and insurance companies."
Therefore, this distinction cannot be said to be universally appli-
cable.
An isolated contract in which a hospital undertakes to fur-
nish board and care to a single individual for the remainder of
her life is not an insurance contract," for the risk distributing
element essential to insurance is absent.45 However, there is a
great public interest in the regulation of the capital and in the
supervision of the management of those corporations which, for
a consideration and in accordance with a general plan, agree to'
furnish hospital services to a large number of persons upon the
happening of certain contingent events. It is submitted that, in
the absence of separate statutes dealing with hospitalization, the
laws governing insurance should ordinarily be applied.
Even more desirable than the application of insurance laws
to hospitalization-in order to secure proper regulation-would
be the drafting of separate legislation that gives due considera-
tion to the peculiar problems involved in the methods of distrib-
41. 178 Pa. St. Rep. 636, 36 Atl. 197 (1897).
42. State v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N.E. 93,
96 Am. St. Rep. 635 (1903); Fischer v. American Legion of Honor, 168 Pa. St.
Rep. 279, 31 At. 1089 (1895).
43. If its purpose is philanthropic, the company is regulated as a mutual
benefit society. Commonwealth v. Equitable Beneficial Ass'n, 137 Pa. St.
Rep. 412, 18 Atl. 1112 (1890).
44. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. Guillaume, 222 Ill. App.
543 (1921).
45. See the five essential elements of a contract of insurance, as stated
by Professor Vance, supra p. 810.
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uting the costs of hospitalization. Hospitals should not be com-
pelled to furnish the same amount of bond as ordinary insurance
companies;4 6 limited capital would often make this practically
impossible. Furthermore, by placing hospitalization under the
supervision of the state, the interests of the public would be ade-
quately protected without the necessity of a large bond. Non-
profit hospital service plans have been included in various' state
regulatory laws by specific enactments for the regulation and
control of hospitalization.47  In some states, non-profit hospital
plans are entitled to complete tax exemption.
4 8
As in other contracts of contingent obligation, judicial and
legislative definitions are of doubtful assistance in determining
whether a hospitalization contract is insurance. The best solu-
tion of the problem presented by the increased number of plans
for the distribution of hospitalization costs is by separate legis-
lation on the subject. Whenever the question of whether hospi-
talization constitutes insurance arises in jurisdictions where the
legislature has been silent, the courts will probably be guided
by what they think socially expedient.
4 9
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46. In Louisiana, the amount to be deposited by service insurance com-
panies with the state treasurer ranges from $500 to $5000, varying with the
number of members: La. Act 136 of 1938, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) §
4170.34); California exempts non-profit hospital service plans from insurance
laws: Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 3432, tit. 255, p. 770; New
Jersey requires that fees amounting to $16.20 be paid by hospital service cor-
porations: N. J. Laws 1938, c. 366, p. 924; New York specifically excludes non-
profit hospital service corporations from any other insurance act and no
provision is made for the amount of bond: 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney
1937) § 452, p. 716.
47. Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, Supp. 1935) Act 3432, tit. 255, p. 770; La.
Act 136 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 4170.32-4170.49]; N.J. Laws 1938,
c. 366, p. 924; 27 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1937) § 452, p. 716. See also
Md. Laws 1935, c. 476, p. 998 (with respect to non-profit hospital service plans
in Allegany County).
48. N.J. Laws 1938, c. 366, p. 924; 27 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney 1937)
§ 452, p. 716. See also Md. Laws 1935, c. 476, p. 998 (with respect to Allegany
County).
It is to be remembered that taxation presents another problem in deter-
mining what is to be considered an insurance company. Under the federal
law an insurance company is subject to an income tax by 48 Stat. 733 (1934),
26 U.S.C.A. § 204 (1935), and is entitled to an exemption from the capital
stock tax by 48 Stat. 769 (1934), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1358 (1935). In Bowers v.
Lawyers Mtg. Co., 285 U.S. 182, 52 S.Ct. 350, 76 L.Ed. 690 (1932), where pre-
miums amounted to less than one-third of corporation's total income it was
considered not an "insurance company" exempt from capital stock tax.
49. The relief associations of railroad companies might be considered
analogous to the hospitalization plans herein discussed; but the cases dealing
with the railroad associations are inapplicable to the present problem since
the courts have held in such cases that the insurance feature is incidental
to the contract of employment. Donald v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 93 Iowa
